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This article is a prelude to an experimental study of the preference
concept in economics. I argue that a new empirical approach called
experimental philosophy of science is a promising approach to advance the
philosophy of economics. In particular, I discuss two debates in the field, the
neuroeconomics controversy and the commonsensible realism debate, and
suggest how experimental and survey techniques can generate data that will
inform these debates. Some of the likely objections from philosophers and
economists are addressed, and possible ways of operationalizing different
preference concepts are illustrated.
1. INTRODUCTION
There is no consensus among economists and philosophers as to the exact
nature of the notion of preference, despite its central role in economic
theory. It is not clear, however, what this lack of agreement means to the
status of economics as a science. Is economics still in a ‘pre-paradigmatic’
period in which participants cannot agree on the meaning of its most basic
theoretical concepts? Or does the disagreement reflect healthy plurality
of the practice in economics, rather than its immaturity? To properly
diagnose the situation, one will need not only to engage with subtle
details of economists’ daily business, but to take a wider view of the
practice in the profession. However, the data that could enable such
a survey have been missing from the philosophical debates regarding
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preference concepts. This makes it difficult to make progress towards
a better understanding of economics. In this paper, I argue that a new
approach called experimental philosophy of science will provide such data
and complement the traditional case studies commonly practiced by
philosophers.
Here is the plan: first, I will briefly describe the recent ‘experimental
philosophy’ (X-phi) movement and experimental philosophy of science
(Section 2). I will then discuss how X-phi of science can illuminate the
debates concerning the preference concept in economics. I will take up
two examples, the the recent neuroeconomics controversy (Section 3)
and the so-called ‘commonsensible’ realism debate in the philosophy of
economics (Section 4). I shall then respond to possible objections and
discuss several methodological advantages of the X-phi approach, and
also sketch how one could begin to study economists’ preference concepts
using this approach (Section 5). The conclusion follows (Section 6).
2. EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Experimental philosophers, or ‘X-philes’ for short, use experimental
and survey methods and statistical analysis of collected data that
are standard in psychological and sociological research, to investigate
people’s intuitions about philosophically important notions such as
knowledge, causality, free will and moral responsibility. X-philes have
made surprising discoveries about the variance of those intuitions across
populations, and contributed to some of the major debates in philosophy
of language, philosophy of mind, epistemology and ethics (Knobe 2007).
Although X-philes differ in their substantial interests and exact
experimental techniques (for a useful typology see Knobe 2007), they all
share a naturalistic conviction that philosophy is continuous with science
as far as methodology is concerned. Although methodological naturalism
is challenged in the debate on the nature of conceptual analysis and
thought experiments (e.g. Sosa 2008), it is uncontroversial at least for the
majority of philosophers of science who consider scientific practice as
essential empirical data for their theorizing. X-phi, however, has not had
much impact on the philosophy of science at the methodological level.
When studying scientific practice, the empirical method philosophers of
science adopt is primarily the case study of historical and contemporary
materials written by scientists, such as textbooks, research articles and
personal memoirs. Philosophy of economics is not an exception in this
regard, and many debates in the field have been inspired by ‘rich’ –
methodologically self-conscious but often philosophically perplexing –
texts by economists, such as Friedman (1953) and more recently Gul and
Pesendorfer (2008).
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The proliferation of case studies in the philosophy of science is
welcome because those studies can reveal subtle but epistemically
important aspects of scientific practice. There is, however, a trade-off
between the level of intimacy with a particular domain of science gained
by case studies on the one hand, and the scope of philosophical analysis
based on such intimate knowledge of practice on the other. In general,
case studies tend to create competing philosophical analyses of scientific
theories, models and concepts derived from various fields and sub-fields,
making it difficult to obtain a full view of a given field (Stotz 2009), let
alone science in general. One way in which philosophers can balance the
requirement of generality and care for relevant details in their analysis
is to collect quantitative data regarding the map of scientific practice in
question, so that existing case studies can be compared and contrasted in a
coherent framework (Weinberg and Crowley 2009). Karola Stotz and Paul
Griffiths pioneered such an approach called ‘experimental philosophy of
science’ (Griffiths and Stotz 2008). Their Representing Genes Project has
used a survey method to reveal competing and complementary gene
concepts and locate them in different fields of biological research (Stotz
2009). Their project is partly motivated to test Moss’s (2003) thesis that
there are two fundamentally different biological concepts of genes, Gene-
D (for developmental) and Gene-P (for preformationism) in modern
biology. Stotz et al. (2004) partially succeeded in operationalizing Moss’s
distinction between the two gene concepts, and further developed their
own three-part typology (instrumental, nominal and post-genomic genes)
(Griffiths and Stotz 2006; Stotz et al. 2006). In this case, an interesting
hypothesis was first proposed based on a detailed case study, and then
it has been tested and developed using the X-phi approach.
A second example of the X-phi of science is a series of studies
on the notion of innateness (Griffiths et al. 2009; Linquist et al. 2011).
The distinction between innate and acquired characteristics plays an
important role in contemporary scientific debates in behavioural ecology
and cognitive psychology (Griffiths 2009), but philosophers have not been
able to reach a consensus regarding the exact definition of innateness
(Griffiths 2002). Griffiths and his colleagues are therefore extending their
X-phi study of the vernacular concept of innateness to systematically
investigate scientists’ concepts of innateness (see also Knobe and Samuels
2013).
So far, only two sets of X-phi studies of science have been conducted,
but they already suggest a couple of advantages of X-phi in studying
scientific practice. First, it can systematically reveal a variance of
a certain theoretical construct (e.g. genes) among different scientific
communities, in an analogous way as X-philes reveal a demographic
variance of intuitions across different populations. Second, X-phi of
science can uncover a deeper theoretical structure underlying a certain
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concept (e.g. innateness), just like some X-phi studies unveil deeper
psychological mechanisms underlying moral reasoning. Unlike non-
experimental conceptual analysis, which tends to fix on one aspect
of a certain concept, experimental methods enable philosophers to
simultaneously operationalize multiple dimensions of a concept, and
investigate (i) which dimension(s) weigh more and (ii) whether and how
different dimensions are interacting (Griffiths and Stotz 2008). How these
findings inform analysis differs from one case to another, and in particular
between X-phi and X-phi of science, but a general point remains the
same: the empirical data make it possible to do better philosophical
analysis. I thus suggest that the same experimental approach will benefit
philosophical discussions on the preference concept in economics as well.
3. PREFERENCE, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ECOLOGICAL
I have noted above that the concept of preference has long been
disputed among economists with different orientations despite its central
role in economic theory. This tension manifests itself in the recent
neuroeconomics controversy (see the special issue of this journal 2008).
While Camerer et al. (2005) claim that unpacking – modelling and
measuring – neurological processes underlying people’s choice behaviour
will help refine, revise or even eliminate the preference as a theoretical
construct, Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) assert that the preference concept in
revealed preference theory (the standard formal economic tool to calibrate
people’s preference ordering from the data regarding choice behaviour)
refers only to observable choice behaviour, and thus neurological (and
psychological) findings have no bearing on the concept.
A typical reaction of philosophers of science to this debate is to crit-
icize Gul and Pesendorfer as instrumentalists. Craver and Alexandrova
(2008), for example, diagnoses that Gul and Pesendorfer’s insistence
on the autonomy of economics from psychology and neuroscience
stems from philosophically untenable and practically ill-suited ideas
of instrumentalism and interdisciplinary incommensurability. But notice
that there is an alternative, perhaps better way of making sense of Gul
and Pesendorfer’s separationist stance, while maintaining with Craver
and Alexandrova (2008) that the sciences of mind and brain can and
do bear on economics. That is, instead of assuming the central issue of
the debate as a metaphysical one of reductionism vs. anti-reductionism
or instrumentalism vs. realism, one can interpret Gul and Pesendorfer’s
extreme position as reflecting their reasonable concern that psychologists
and neuroscientists do not understand the distinctly economic notion of
preference, partly because they do not share underlying epistemic and
practical goals central to economics.
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This interpretation consists in two hypotheses; following Griffiths
and Stotz (2008), I call them conceptual variance and conceptual ecology,
respectively. In general, conceptual variance is the thesis that different
scientific communities use a particular concept differently (e.g. molecular
and evolutionary biologists use ‘genes’ in different ways). Conceptual
ecology is the thesis that such conceptual differences reflect scientific
requirements of different communities. Don Ross is the philosopher who
comes closest to explicitly stating these hypotheses in relation to the
preference concept. In discussing why many economists are sympathetic
to Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), Ross (2011) highlights a dissociation
between economists’ and psychologists’ concepts of choice:
[W]hile the psychologist’s idea of choice descends from a culturally familiar
folk construct generally thought to lie within everyone’s unreflective
personal acquantaince, the economist’s distinct concept of choice is an
abstract idea that does not derive from everyday folk ontology [. . .] Choice
as economist’s understand it is abstract and discernible only through
statistical analysis of large numbers of observations. (Ross 2011: 219, 225)
These facts, Ross suggests, are reflected in economists’ methodological
practice of constructing choice models from (and testing them against)
those choice data that are systematically responsive to changes in
exogenous variables. According to Ross, the concept of choice, and
therefore that of preference in economics,1 is distinct from psychological
and folk counterparts. That is, Ross is arguing to the effect that preference,
as economists understand and use the concept, cannot be causally
equivalent to the aggregate of individual psychological or neurological
processes. Rather, he claims, they are a more selective theoretical construct
measurable only up to the scale of discernible statistical responses to those
variables.
A related point has been made by both theorists (Becker 1962; Satz
and Ferejohn 1994) and experimentalists (Gode and Sunder 1993), who
show that what produces the allocative efficiency of certain markets is not
the rationality of individual participants (e.g. that they have consistent
preference), but rather the structure of the markets in which choice takes
place (e.g. budget constraints): ‘In the case of any given regularity [in
choice data], factors ‘outside the head’ [. . .] may be carrying more or less of
the load’ (Ross 2011: 224) in predicting and explaining market phenomena.
The analyses by Ross and others suggest that the preference concept
in economics is not purely psychological but ecological, in the sense
1 Although Ross talks about choice instead of preference, we can read him as commenting
on preference because he explicitly subscribes to Paul Samuelson’s doctrine that revealed
preferences are choice behaviours (ibid. :221). We should not be distracted by this
philosophically controversial interpretation at this stage.
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that it captures causal mechanisms through which environmental factors
(i.e. those outside the head) mould choice. My way of paraphrasing
Ross’s insightful observations is to say that different economists
understand preference differently, and accordingly use them differently
in their practice (conceptual variance), and that these differences
reflect scientific requirements of different communities of economists,
rather than conceptual confusions and idiosyncrasies of individual
economists (conceptual ecology).2 More specifically, at least psychological
and ecological concepts of preference/choice can be distinguished
in economics. They are not necessarily mutually incompatible but
distinct, stemming from different explanatory and practical purposes
of different sub-fields in economics. For example, influenced by
cognitive (neuro)science, behavioural economists and neuroeconomists
are interested in unpacking psychological and neurological processes
(e.g. framing and emotions) underlying individual decision making. In
contrast, other economists, including some experimental economists, are
primarily interested in the effects of various institutional and social
arrangements to market efficiency.
To make clearer what I take the differences between psychological
and ecological notions of preference to be, I mention another typology
of the nature of preference in the literature, and discuss how this
typology is related to mine. Some behavioural decision researchers (e.g.
Slovic 1995) and behavioural economists (Hoeffler and Ariely 1999)
make a similar typology of different notions of preference, namely
intrinsic and constructed. The former is the view that economic theory
presupposes causally basic, underlying preferences (‘needs and wants’)
behind consumer choices, while the latter is the position that often people
construct their preferences in a given context based on cues available at
the time of preference elicitation (Hoeffler and Ariely 1999: 114–115).
Although Hoeffler and Ariely (1999: 113) note that ‘most researchers
believe in a middle ground,’ they hint that economists are inclined
to believe in the existence of preference as psychological dispositions,
while psychologists tend to see them as constructed by the ways
in which options are described and preferences elicited.3 Notice that
Hoeffler and Ariely’s (1999) typology is alternative to and inconsistent
2 Ross (2011) himself insists that behavioural economics and the major part of
neuroeconomics are not really economics but the psychology of individual valuation. I
will not discuss what should be the proper domain of economics, since my main interest
in this paper is to better understand the state of economics rather than to prescribe what
kind of science economics should be.
3 Those who are subscribed to the doctrine of revealed preference would immediately reject
this characterization of economists’ notion of preference, because for revealed preference
theorists preference are choice behaviours, not their underlying causes. I’ll get back to this
point below.
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with my conceptual variance hypothesis. My hypothesis implies that
the mainstream economists believe that preferences are not much
about individual psychology, whereas behavioural economists and
neuroeconomists inspired by cognitive psychology and neuroscience
study preferences as stable psychological dispositions measurable
by experimentation. So according to my framework, the traditional
economists are more likely to hold the constructed-preference perspective,
while the heterodox behavioural economists might tacitly share the
intrinsic view of preference that Hoeffler and Ariely (1999) attribute to
the mainstream economists.
Why is it important to test these hypotheses? Because, first of all, it
provides scientists with empirically reliable data regarding conceptual
differences that can work as a basis of good communication across
different scientific communities. Currently we have only casual compar-
isons between economics and psychology from one-sided disciplinary
perspectives. Second, an overview of the conceptual variance will provide
a framework within which philosophers and methodologists can evaluate
and diagnose interdisciplinary research practices. For example, what is the
cause of the moderate empirical success of the so-called ‘social preference’
models – models that try to explain apparently non-selfish behaviour as
a result of individuals’ preferences for fairness etc.? One can diagnose
social preference models as too economic or psychological, but whether
these diagnoses are accurate and useful crucially depends on what are the
distinctively economic and psychological uses of the preference concept.
An X-phi of economics study can provide such information.
4. PREFERENCE, FOLK AND SCIENTIFIC
A second example of the debates that can be informed by the evidence
from the Xphi of science approach concerns the ontology of preferences.
Hausman (1998) and Mäki (2000) maintain that preferences are, like
beliefs, a venerable, unquestionable folk-psychological concept whose
ontology belongs to our everyday ontic furniture of tables and chairs,
unlike other posited scientific unobservables such as electrons and gravity.
Hausman and Mäki arrive at rather different conclusions from this
observation, but both agree on the common-sensical status of most
theoretical constructs in economics. This view, ‘commonsensible realism’,
has been criticized as not cogent for some macroeconomic aggregates such
as ‘real GDP’ and ’general price level’ (Hoover 1995), and lately its truth in
microeconomics is also questioned. Guala (2011), for example, argues that,
although the preference concept is continuous with our folk psychology,
it has also been used as a scientific or investigative kind term precisely
defined by decision theory, and thus its ontological status can be and
in fact has been empirically challenged. The accumulating evidence in
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behavioural research, Guala argues, strongly suggests that ‘preference’ is
not a natural kind term that cuts the mind at its joints. That is, the concept
refers to a set of heterogeneous psychological dispositions underlying
choice behaviour (just like ‘jade’ refers to two distinct minerals, jadeite
and nephriteas), and therefore its usefulness for scientific prediction and
explanation of behaviour is rather limited. If this is true, commonsensible
realists’ strategy to defend the preference concept as a sound scientific
kind term by associating it with our folk psychology must be given up.
Preceding case studies of the development of decision theory (e.g. Guala
2000; Nagatsu 2010) support the view that there is no clear line between
folk and scientific notions of preference, but rather that researchers from
different scientific communities may hold different scientific concepts of
preference that depart from the folk concept in different respects.4 My
conceptual variance hypothesis regarding preference explicates what this
difference might be. And whether or not this specific hypothesis is true,
the empirical results will inform the commonsensible realism debate,
which at this stage is framed as, rather simplistically, a choice between
the ‘folk’ and ‘scientific’ ways of understanding the preference concept.
While Guala’s (2011) argument is based on his observation of the
development of behavioural decision theory, Hands (2011) builds his
critique of commonsensible realism on his examination of contemporary
revealed preference theory (CRPT), an approach to the theory of consumer
choice in contemporary microeconomics. CRPT:
uses revealed preference theory to test for the consistency of given data –
consistency that is with respect to constrained ordinal utility maximization
– and also to estimate a utility function that (when maximized) can be used
to infer choices for other parameter values. (Hands 2011: 355–356)
Hands points out that this exercise cannot be interpreted as consistent
with our folkpsychological understanding of preference (together with
beliefs) as determinants of choice. That is, the exercise is not an
attempt to measure underlying forces (preferences) that cause the
aggregate consumer choice in question. This interpretation is excluded
because, Hands explains, practitioners of CRPT characterize their
exercise explicitly in a way that makes this commonsense interpretation
impossible. Hands (2011) is critical about CRPT, not necessarily because it
radically departs from folk psychology, but because it goes against the
realist methodology of tracking the causal mechanisms to predict and
explain phenomena, to which common sense psychology appears more
congenial. That is, Hands seems to think that CRPT is both metaphysically
and methodologically problematic because it does not care about causes,
4 The folk concept itself might be diverse, as suggested by many X-phi studies of different
intuitions, but that is not my focus here.
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which are exactly what science should be after. But again, is it justified to
criticize the practitioners of CRPT as scientific anti-realists? An alternative
interpretation, suggested by Ross (2011), is that those economists are
looking at the causes operating on a ‘different scale of resolution’ on
the overlapping physical domains, namely on the scale of statistically
discernible behavioural reactions to ecological forces rather than internal,
psychological forces.
Hands’s criticism derives from his interpretation of economists’
commentaries on their practice, which he takes to be good data for
methodological analysis. But why should we assume that those outspoken
economists are good at philosophically articulating or generalizing about
their practice? Since they are (usually) not trained in philosophy, we
should at least compare economists’ methodological reflections with
other, more reliable types of evidence. Published (non-self-analysis-type)
works by economists are an obvious candidate, and they are in fact
the primary source of historical and philosophical case studies. But as I
pointed out earlier, case studies are not helpful when it comes to making
a generalization about scientific practice.5 Hence the need of X-phi of
science.
5. SOME OBJECTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this section, I will first address three likely objections to applying X-
phi in the study of economics. The third one will lead to a discussion of
some of the methodological advantages of the factorial survey approach
that some X-philes adopt. I also briefly and roughly sketch how one
could begin to design an X-phi study of the preference concept in
economics.
A first objection is a common charge by some philosophers that X-
philes commit a naturalistic fallacy. But this allegation doesn’t apply to
X-philes of science who are under no illusion that normative critiques
of science can be derived solely from the facts about scientific practice.
Their suggestion is rather that philosophers of science can better perform
normative jobs – be it metaphysical, conceptual or practical – if they have
a better picture of relevant scientific practice, just like doctors can better
improve particular patients’ conditions if they have a wider empirical
basis, including epidemiological findings as well as close knowledge
of those particular patients. A second objection, expected from some
philosophers of science, is that generalization about scientific practice
5 Alternatively, Chang (2004: 233) sees the point of case studies as an articulation of
philosophically important abstract ideas – progress, measurement, explanation, evidence,
etc. – rather than the generalization about scientific methodology. But Chang as a
methodological pluralist would not deny that generalization of scientific practice can also
help make better philosophical analysis.
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can be made by accumulating case studies, instead of conducting X-
phi studies. However, this suggestion is impractical because, as Chang
(2004) rightly stresses, case studies often aim at an articulation of abstract
philosophical ideas that will greatly vary across different case studies,
even if these studies look at the same research articles. The X-phi
method, in contrast, can be used to simultaneously study a much larger
sample of scientists in a systematic manner.6 Third, some economists
might suspect that the notions of preference that an X-phi study elicits
will be personal opinions and tastes of different economists that are
irrelevant to the understanding of their professional practice. This is a
legitimate methodological concern, but it can be fully dealt with only
by actually designing and conducting an X-phi study, and ultimately by
demonstrating relevant correlations between professional backgrounds
and elicited notions of preference. Since fully satisfying the sceptics in
this way is beyond the scope of the present paper, I will try to indirectly
address their concern by discussing (i) several methodological advantages
of the factorial survey approach, and (ii) possible ways of identifying
relevant dimensions in the preference concept.
Although I have found no X-philes acknowledging this, some X-phi
studies, in particular X-phi of science studies, can be best characterized
as a version of factorial surveys. The factorial survey approach has been
used in sociology for more than three decades to study the structure of
people’s attitudes and judgements about social objects such as norms
and practices (for a review see Wallander 2009). This approach has
respondents evaluate several vignettes (fictive descriptions), but differs
from the conventional survey method both in generating vignettes by
systematically varying the levels of factors of theoretical interest, and in
systematically assigning vignette sets to groups of respondents so that
the main and interaction effects of factors can be statistically estimated.
Factorial surveys, characterized for this reason as quasi-experimental, or
survey experiments, are increasingly popular in social research, as they
facilitate a cost-effective sampling of a large number of subjects while
allowing for manipulation and control of factors in vignettes (Nock and
Guterbock 2010). Compared with more conventional surveys, factorial
surveys have several advantages (Wallander 2009), such as being (i)
more suitable to studying the contexts and conditions that actually affect
judgements because respondents are presented with concrete and detailed
descriptions in which hypothesized factors are systematically varied, and
(ii) better at identifying the actual determinants – or combinations of
determinants – of human judgements because it can isolate and measure
(interactions of) certain factors that influence their judgements, but of
6 Although not experimental, scientometorics is another underdeveloped type of
quantitative method of science studies.
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which people are not always aware and unable to articulate when they
introspect about them. These methodological advantages have already
been partly exploited in e.g. Griffiths et al. (2009).
So the X-phi of science using factorial surveys seems promising in
general, but how can we design an X-phi of economics study to test the
conceptual variance hypothesis? First of all, prior to the factorial survey, it
will be useful to ask economists a few straightforward questions regarding
the nature and methodological values of the preference concept in
economics, following Stotz et al. (2004). This will be done by constructing
multiple choices from stylized views found in economics textbooks and
manifesto-type articles. Such a survey will be useful since currently there
is no such quantitative data available. Moreover, the data can be used as a
benchmark against which responses to a factorial survey are compared.
A first step in designing a factorial survey is to identify key
dimensions of the preference concept from the literature. I will sketch
three examples below: (i) Although compulsive or addictive behaviour
may not be seen as a result of one’s preferences in the vernacular sense,
many drug addicts’ consumption behaviour is amenable to preference-
theoretic analysis as it is responsive to changes in incentives (Ross
2011). Vignettes about addictive consumption and other non-standard
economic behaviour can be used to measure the importance of this factor
(voluntariness) in associating certain behaviour with decision makers’
preferences. (ii) Another relevant dimension concerns the stochastic
character of choice data, which Harrison (2008: 326n) discusses in
criticizing Gul and Pesendorfer’s theorist bias. When experimentally
measuring people’s risk attitudes in binary choice, for example, it is
inevitable to have certain assumptions about the nature of errors in choice.
Economists have competing models according to which those errors
take place at different stages (at the final choice, on the comparison of
preferences, or determination of expected utility). Simulating this model
choice in a questionnaire will be an interesting way of operationalizing the
ecological–psychological distinction of preferences, particularly because
the use of different stochastic models may reflect economists’ different
epistemic goals such as prediction and explanation (Wilcox 2008). (iii)
The literature suggests a tension in the interpretation of the invariance
principle in preference measurement. Invariance is the assumption that,
in extensionally identical choice problems, the relationship between
preferences and choice behaviour is not affected by how choice situations
are framed or how preferences are elicited. Although it has been
identified as ‘[a]n elementary effect of rationality’ in economics (Arrow
1982: 6), there is much evidence against invariance. An interesting
question is whether the invariance principle in economics drives from
the concept of preference as underlying psychological dispositions, as
Hoeffler and Ariely (1999) suggest, or from some other methodological
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or practical reasons. One way of addressing this question is to
operationalize invariance and intrinsicness separately, and measure their
interactions.
Although these examples are preliminary sketches, I hope that the
sceptics now see that the preference concept is a promising candidate
for an X-phi study because the existing literature already points towards
several interesting hypotheses regarding the concept and possible ways to
test them.
6. CONCLUSION
In the introduction, I mentioned two possible implications of the
preference concept’s variance in economics. One is a Kuhnian scenario
that economics is plagued with a conceptual mess that needs tidying
and therefore is not mature or ‘normal’ yet as a scientific discipline. In
this case, philosophers’ prescriptive role will loom large in improving
economics. Another scenario suggested by conceptual ecology is that
the conceptual variance rather reflects different epistemic niches for
different communities of economists. If the latter is the case, it might
be bad news for those philosophers whose main methodology is
armchair conceptual analysis of folk psychology, with the assumption
that economic theory is a folk psychology in mathematical disguise. But
for those already closely examining economists’ practice, there is still
much important philosophical work left to be done, such as explicating
the conceptual ecology of economists. Economists, just as any scientists,
are not particularly suited for this task since they usually get trained
to adapt to particular epistemic niches that they end up occupying for
the rest of their careers. In contrast, philosophers, with an outsider’s
perspective, can systematically study situations of different communities
to make sense (if there is any) of the plurality of their scientific practice.
To do this, however, philosophers themselves must re-examine their own
methodological traditions in light of changing needs and opportunities to
better understand and advance economics.
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